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HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Mattes v. City of Baltimore'

Appellant was injured while working for the City at
the Logan Field airport. He was employed to do janitor's
work which included helping with the plumbing at times,
washing windows, sweeping floors, cutting grass, loading
trucks, cleaning offices and emptying wastebaskets, sometimes helping to get passengers to automobiles when the
ground was wet, and anything else he was told to do
by the general foreman. When the Highways Department
was working at the new airport, he filled tanks; and, at
times, he helped a fellow laborer push planes into the
hangar. He was classified by the City Service Commission
as a laborer, and was so listed at the Central Pay Roll
Bureau of the City. There was no classification of janitor
at the airport for any employees, but the officials considered the work that Appellant was doing to be janitor's
work. The injury occurred while Appellant was at work
emptying large waste containers into smaller baskets to
be carried in a wheelbarrow to the back of the hangar to
be burned. It became necessary for him to give an unusual pull to get a wire basket out, and in doing it he
strained and injured his back. He applied to the State Industrial Accident Commission for workmen's compensation for his injury and was denied relief on the ground that
his work was not of the extra-hazardous nature for which
compensation is provided by the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act.' This ruling was affirmed on appeal
(to the Baltimore City Court, and the latter holding was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Appellant's work was
predominantly that of a janitor, and that he was working
as a janitor when he was hurt; and that there was nothing
in the evidence to overcome the correctness of the Commission's finding that this was non-hazardous work.8 The
Court reasoned that since the enumeration of employments
in Section 33 of the Act 4 did not include the employment
of janitor as one of them, the injury to a janitor could
1I180 Md. 579, 26 A. (2d)

390 (1942).
'Md. Code (1939) Art. 101.
' Citing Md. Code (1939) Art. 101, Sec. 70, which provides that on appeal
"the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and the burden
of proof shall be upon the party tttacking the same".
'Md. Code (1939) Art. 101.
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be compensable only by reason of connection with other
work that was compensable. Conceding for purposes of
the case that the conduct of an airport could be deemed
"hazardous" within the meaning of the comprehensive
clause of Section 335 by analogy to the paragraph specifically covering "the operation of . . . vehicles propelled
by gasoline", the Court concluded that the work Appellant
was employed to do was "not connected with the promotion of the hazardous work of the airport. His work came
after and behind it. He cleaned up the premises and carried off the waste."
This ruling of the Court culminates a line of cases,
dealing with municipal employees, enumerating a very
strict construction of the category of extra-hazardous employment meant to be covered by the Maryland Act other
than the specific employments enumerated in Section 33.
Under Section 46 of Code, Article 101, the "State, county,
city, or any municipality" is covered by the article if engaged in any "extra-hazardous work in which workmen
are employed for hire." In several rulings under Sections
46 and 33 in combination, decided with reference to employees of Baltimore City, the Court of Appeals has excluded from the operation of the Act: (1) park policeman; 6
(2) nurses in City hospitals;7 (3) an orderly in a City
hospital;' (4) a janitress in a public school;' and, in the
instant case, (5) a janitor at the municipal airport.10
In the first of these decisions, namely the one involving
the park policeman, the Court's opinion rested considerably
on the fact that the words "workmen employed for hire"
in Section 35 (now 46) of the Statute was restrictive language and meant something less than the term employee
in Section 32 (now 33), the section enumerating the hazardous employments for private industry. The Court thus
distinguished the case of Todd v. Eastern Furniture Company" which had held a night watchman in a private plant
to be covered by the Act, saying:"
"* * * Section 32 of article 101 of the C. P. G. L. of
Md. extended the application of the statute to all 'emWhich makes the act applicable to "all extra-hazardous employments
not specifically enumerated".
6Harris v. Baltimore, 151 Md. 11, 133 A. 888 (1926).
"Baltimore v. Smith, 168 Md. 458, 177 A. 903 (1934).
Baltimore v. Trunk, 172 Md. 35, 190 A. 756 (1937).
Baltimore v. Schwind, 175 Md. 60, 199 A. 853 (1938).
Mattes v. Baltimore, 180 Md. 579, 26 A. (2d) 390 (1942).
147 Md. 352, 128 A. 42 (1924).
Harris v. Baltimore, 151 Md. 11, 17, 133 A. 888 (1926).
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ployees' engaged in extra-hazardous 'employments'
for private employers, so that whether the service
rendered by Todd could properly be classified as
'work', there was no possible doubt that it was an
'employment,' and for a private employer, and so
within the express and literal language of the act.
But in this case we are dealing with a section which
imposed upon the State and certain governmental subdivisions thereof duties and obligations which would
not have rested upon them at all but for that section
(28 Cyc. 1257), in so far as those duties and obligations
involved the exercise of their public governmental
functions. We would not under those circumstances
be justified in giving to the section a meaning broader
than the lexical and usual significance of its language
would convey, unless constrained to such a construction by the plain and obvious intent of the whole act.
But we find no such intent. There was obvious reason why the municipality, in respect to certain work,
should be within the act, because as to work of a
private character, or certain public work such as the
construction and repair of highways, and other works
of public improvement, either by statute or the common law, they were under the same liability to their
employees for their torts as private employers. In
such cases both the municipality and its employees
suffered from the same mischief which led to the passage of the act for the benefit and relief of private
persons and their employees. But that was not true
in respect to agents employed by the State or subdivision thereof to perform functions essentially public
and governmental, because in such cases no such liability existed. And when the Legislature, in extending the scope of the act to persons in the employ of
the State and its several political subdivisions, expressly limited its application to those cases in which
'workmen were employed for wages', it expressed no
intent either in section 35 or the other sections of the
act to have it apply to cases in which liability had
never theretofore existed. If it had intended to embrace such agents as policemen, and all other persons
engaged in extra-hazardous employments for municipalities, it would certainly have expressed that intention in clearer language than that which we have
quoted. * * *"
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If the subsequent holdings, above referred to, had rested
themselves on the special language of Section 46 relative
to governmental employees, there would be no great significance to their rulings except to keep municipal liability
more strictly confined than that of private industry. However, the other four rulings, dealing with the nurse, the
school janitress, the orderly, and the airport janitor, do
not specially rely on the limited intention of the legislature with reference to municipal liability, but use language
which would analogize that liability to that of other hazardous employment under Section 33, but finding no coverage on the facts of each case. The language of Baltimore
v. Smith, holding a nurse not to be covered, is typical.
Speaking of the enumerated employment under what is
phrase of
now Section 33, and interpreting the inclusion
1
paragraph 46 of the section, the Court said: "
"These particular works or employments may be
roughly classified as falling within one of the following divisions of employment: First, the construction,
repair or operation of public utilities and water borne
vessels, and their accessory equipment, shops, plants,
or shipyards, and warehouses or other places of storage, docks, or warehouses: second, construction work
of various kinds and types, and its installation and
operation: third, mining, lumbering, quarrying, and
other methods of production of raw material, its
preparation for use, and its manufacture for the purposes of trade, commerce, and consumption: fourth,
packing, canning, and preparation of food supplies:
fifth, operation of designated vehicles and machinery:
and, sixth, manual, mechanical, and industrial arts.
While this classification is general and approximate,
it serves to illustrate the nature of the employments
which the Legislature intended to be embraced by
the act, and thereby to indicate, by the .employments
which are included, the type of employment which is
excluded as not being hazardous. * * *
"A consideration of the particular paragraphs discloses that, with the exception of the later additions
of a certain class of salesmen and of musicians and
officers of the state police and guards in penal institutions (paragraphs 43, 45, section 32, and section 35
as amended (Code Pub. Gen. Laws, Supp. 1929, sec. 32,
'a168 Md. 458, 462, 177 A. 903 (1934).
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pars. 43, 45 and sec. 35)), these paragraphs refer to
particular employments in which the employees are
workmen, who, in a general sense, are men employed
in manual or industrial labor as artificers, mechanics,
artisans, operators of machinery, and laborers, and so
the hazards of the employment or work within the
meaning of the statute are those incident to the labor
of the manual or industrial servant while working in
his trade, craft, art, or occupation, as contra-distinguished from those employments in which the servants
are engaged in clerical or professional work. In short,
unless otherwise specifically provided, the act applies
to employment in an industrial enterprise. * * "
This language referred to with approval in the hospital
orderly case,' 4 would seem to be as applicable to private
industry as to municipal employment and is restrictive
rather than expansive of the meaning of paragraph 46 in
covering unenumerated hazardous employments. The
Mattes case would seem both on its facts and language to
clinch this approach of strict construction, closing any outlets that might have been opened by loose language in
earlier cases.
For example, language in Baltimore v. Trunk, 5 and
Baltimore v. Schwind,16 could easily have been construed
to indicate that protection existed under the law whenever
one was employed by a hazardous industry within the7
meaning of the law. In the Trunk case, the Court said:'
"In the appeal at bar, the Charitable hospital, as
such, was not an industrial enterprise nor specifically
declared to be an extra-hazardous employment by the
language of the law, and so an employee of the hospital, if injured within the scope and course of his
employment, would not be entitled to compensation
merely because he was an employee, as would be the
case if the hospital were either an industrial enterprise or definitely included in the operation of the
Compensation Law. * * ."18
The apparently broad effect of such language would
seem to be destroyed by the holding and language of the
"Baltimore v. Trunk, 172 Md. 35, 40, 190 A. 756 (1937).
" Ibid.
175 Md. 60, 67, 199 A. 853 (1938).

- 172 Md. 35, 41, 190 A. 756 (1937).
"Citing, Boteler v. Gardiner Buick Co., 164 Md. 478, 481, 165 A. 611
(1933).
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Mattes case. After assuming that the general business of
conducting an airport was hazardous, .the Court said:19
"* * * The whole of Article 101 is applicable to
extra-hazardous work in which the city engages. Code,
1939, Art. 101, Sec. 46; Acts of 1941, Ch. 433. But the
fact that the municipality engages in some work that
is extra-hazardous, along with work that is not so, is
not sufficient to bring all employees in either work
within the benefits of the Act. Harris v. Baltimore,
151 Md. 11, 133 A. 888.
"Whether all workmen of a hazardous business,
even those employed in non-hazardous work, are
within a Workmen's Compensation Act is a question
on which courts of other States have differed. See
note, 83 A. L. R. 1018. But there are differences in
the statutes applied. In some States the Acts contain
specific clauses to include all workmen employed in
a hazardous business. Matter of Europe v. Addison
Amusements, 231 N. Y. 105, 131 N. E. 750; Byas v.
Hotel Bentley, 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303; Illinois Publishing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 299 Ill. 189, 132
N. E. 511. And there is no such provision in the Maryland law. To be included, it seems, the workman injured must have been employed incidentally to the
promotion or prosecution of the hazardous work. This
was the meaning of expressions in earlier decisions
of this court. * * "20
The earlier cases referred to were the ones discussed

21
above except for the case of Boteler v. Gardiner-BuickCo.

In that case an outside salesman who was required to work
an allotted portion of alternative days within the company's showrooms was injured while on duty in the showroom. The problem presented was whether the salesman
was in fact an outside salesman within the meaning of the
Act. The Court reinstated an award made by the Commission and reversed the judgment of the Superior Court
of Baltimore City. The Court ruled that the greater part
(about 70%) of the injured man's work was clearly that
of an outside salesman; and his work in the salesroom
- 180 Md. 579, 582.
20 Referring to: Boteler v. Gardiner Buick Co., 164 Md. 478, 481, 482, 165
A. 611, 612 (1935) ; Harris v. Baltimore, 151 Md. 11, 14, 15, 133 A. 888,
889 (1926) ; Baltimore v. Trunk, 172 Md. 35, 190 A. 756, 758 (1937) ; and
Baltimore v. Schwind, 175 Md. 60, 67, 199 A. 853, 857 (1938).
1 Supra n. 20.
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could be said to be supplementary to his work as an outside salesman because the peculiar nature of his occupation usually involved a series of negotiations taking place
inside and outside of the place of employment. Once it
is established that solicitation of sales outside of the master's establishment was the predominant, primary and substantial service required of the injured person, and since
that occupation is clearly within the Act, the Court will
refuse to break down the individual's services into those
which are hazardous and those which are not hazardous.
It may be argued that the Boteler case shows a more
liberal construction of the outside salesmen paragraph
than does the Mattes case for the general provisions of
Section 33 and hence that the approach of the Court in
each of the two cases is difficult to reconcile. The difference of the Court in each case can better be understood
in the light of the essential problem in each case, and it
is submitted that the essential problem in each case was
quite different. In the Mattes case the problem was
whether the Act was broad enough to include the class of
work engaged in by the injured, while in the Boteler case
the problem was whether liability could be excused on the
theory that some of the employee's duties were covered
by the Act and some were not.22 Thus in the Mattes case
there arises a situation in which the traditional approach
of the courts in strictly construing a statute in abrogation
of the common law is brought into play since at common
law there could be no liability on the part of the City.
In the Boteler case there is an unmistakeable expression
of legislative intent to include the major bulk of the employee's business activities within the Act in addition to
the impracticability, at least on the facts of that case, of
adopting a theory of dual employment, i. e. extra-hazardous
and non-hazardous employment within the same employee's duties. These factors tend to explain the liberality
of the approach in the Boteler case and their absence in
addition to the previously mentioned reason tends to explain the stricter approach in the Mattes case.
The Mattes case is interesting as a continuation by the
Court of the principle of breaking down a class of occupa"This same problem was also present in the Mattes case to a minor
degree. It seems to have been suggested that Mattes' employment was
essentially hazardous because he occasionally filled tanks for highway

department trucks and 'helped push planes into the hangar and hence
he was within the Act, his other activities being incidental to the ones

mentioned. The Court rejected the argument by saying, "Predominantly
he was a janitor, and he was working as a janitor when he was hurt."
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tions in regard to a municipality into those which are
covered by the Act and those which are not. In this sense
the principle established in the Harris case" is very much
alive, namely that the legislature must have meant less
coverage in regard to government employees than those
of private industry. Why this should be so is difficult to
understand. Insofar as the principle rests on a subconscious application of rules of construction, it would seem
to be unwarranted by the social theory behind compensation laws. At least the case demonstrates that the approach of the Court in applying the Act to municipal employees has become so firmly established that it can be
cured only by legislative enactment. The case also demonstrates that the reluctance of the Court to break down
an individual's employment into the part within the Act
and that not within the Act is not to be applied to a class
of occupations. This latter principle would seem to be
applicable to private employment as well as to public employment. Yet it is to be hoped that the principle will
not be applied to private industry because it has arisen
solely because of a mistaken notion that within the framework of workmen's compensation laws, the government
as an employer should occupy a different position than
that of private industry.
Supra n. 6.

